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Abstract
Efficient distribution has a considerable influence on the sales volume of firms, and
thus affects the firms’ research and development (R&D) activities. This paper analyzes
the relationship between competition in the transport sector and R&D of firms using
the transportation services. We consider a two-region reciprocal market in which firms
invest in cost-reducing R&D and use carriers that engage in price competition to supply
their products to the foreign market. We show that, corresponding to the degree of
R&D spillover, a transport cost (or price) reduction due to an increase in the number of
carriers can increase or decrease the firms’ R&D investments. This result is consistent
with the finding in previous studies that trade liberalization can hinder R&D. Because
inefficient firms lead to high prices in the market, an increase in the number of carriers
may reduce consumer surplus. We further discuss a case in which firms have monopsony
power in transportation services and show that our main results are robust to the
extension.
Key words: Transport price; R&D spillovers; Price competition; Monopsony power
JEL classification: F12; L13; R40
∗Corresponding author: Kazuhiro Takauchi, Faculty of Business and Commerce, Kansai University,
3-3-35 Yamate-cho, Suita, Osaka 564-8680, Japan. E-mail: kazh.takauch@gmail.com; Tel.: +81-6-
6368-1817.
†Research Fellow, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
‡Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University, 2-1 Rokkodai-cho, Nada-ku, Kobe-City, Hyogo
657-8501, Japan. E-mail: mizuno@econ.kobe-u.ac.jp.
1 Introduction
It is well known that trade barriers, such as transport costs and tariffs affect firms’
innovation incentives.1 In particular, transport cost is a major trade barrier;2 and the
level of this cost affects firms’ innovation activities. For example, a high freight rate
imposes high shipment costs and limits the market access of exporting firms. This
restricts production activities, and hence can diminish the incentives for innovation,
such as cost-reducing research and development (R&D).
To consider the relation between trade barriers and innovation activities, many
researchers have been analyzed it until now. However, there are conflicting views among
them. Whereas some studies empirically find that trade liberalization can promote
firms’ R&D activity (Aw et al., 2011; Bustos, 2011; Lileeva & Trefler, 2010), other
studies find that R&D investment can decrease due to a reduction in trade barriers
(Scherer & Huh, 1992; Funk, 2003). There are also sharp differences among theoretical
works. Especially, such difference is remarkable among studies that employ oligopoly
flamework. Some studies find that R&D investment always decreases or increases with
a reduction in trade barriers (Ghosh & Lim, 2013; Haaland & Kind, 2008; Hwang et
1Trade barriers also affect factors of competition, such as market size and intensity of the exporting
market competition. Innovation incentives depend on these factors of competition, such that the level
of trade barriers (low and high) affects a firm’s innovation incentives. See, for example, Aghion et al.
(2004, 2005).
2For industrialized countries, transport cost is at least as large a barrier as policy barriers. According
to Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004), the ad-valorem tax equivalent of transport cost is 10.7%, and
that of tariff and non-tariff barriers is 7%.
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al., 2018; Takauchi & Mizuno, 2019b), while others find a U-shaped effect (Long et al.,
2011).
Hence, it might be difficult to predict that a reduction in trade barriers such as
transport cost always strengthens innovation incentives for firms. Sometimes, trade
liberalization may promote firm’s R&D investment while in other cases, it may inhibit
them.
In this paper, we propose a model in which a reduction in transport cost causes
both a rise and fall in the firm’s R&D investment. By considering a market structure
consisting of many carriers (transporting firms) and two innovative exporting firms,
we demonstrate that a reduction in the transport price caused by a rise in the num-
ber of carriers can bring about both an increase and decrease in the exporters’ R&D
investment.
We base our model on a Brander and Krugman (1983)-type reciprocal market.
While each region’s exporting firm uses inter-regional transport services and pays a
freight charge to export overseas, it can freely supply its local market. To reduce
their production costs, exporting firms engage in R&D activity involving knowledge
spillovers.3 Inter-regional transportation is a homogenous service, and carriers compete
on price a` la Dastidar (1995).
We show that a rise in the number of carriers increases (decreases) the exporters’
R&D investment under a low (high) spillover rate of R&D. A higher spillover rate
3Prior empirical studies demonstrate positive international spillovers in R&D. See Coe and Helpman
(1995) and Keller (1998). Xu and Wang (1999) further find that capital goods trade is an important
conduit for international R&D spillovers.
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reduces production costs, stimulating production. The transport demand rises due
to the expanded production, and so carriers lower their prices as the spillover rate
rises. Furthermore, the larger number of carriers promotes exports through the reduced
transport price, but this lower price decreases domestic supply. If the spillover rate is
low, the transport price is low; and thus, exports face lower restriction. Then, because
the degree of export increase due to the transport price reduction exceeds the range of
reduction of the domestic supply, the export promotion due to the rise in the number
of carriers encourages R&D. Conversely, if the spillover rate is high, the transport price
is high and the trade barrier is also high. Then, because the range of reduction of the
domestic supply due to the lower transport price exceeds the degree of export increase,
the export promotion due to the rise in the number of carriers discourages R&D.
We also show that a higher number of carriers harms consumers under a high R&D
spillover rate.4 A rise in the number of carriers lowers the transport price, and its effect
strengthens as the spillover rate increases. The transport price reduction increases the
foreign rival’s exports and decreases the domestic supply. Hence, when the transport
price reduction begins to have a large impact on the extent to which domestic supply
decreases, aggregate output falls because the decline in the domestic supply exceeds
the increase in the foreign rival’s exports. In general, the promotion of competition due
to an increase in the number of firms reduces prices and enhances consumer benefit. In
contrast to this standard view, our result indicates that the promotion of competition in
4We place the considerations of total surplus in the Supplementary Material because we focus here
on the firm’s R&D investment and consumer surplus. In addition, our model does not significantly
change Brander and Krugman’s (1983) result with respect to the total surplus.
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the transport sector can reduce consumer surplus.5 Hence, we believe that our analysis
provides a new insight into the context of the relation between competition and welfare.
To avoid criticism of the assumption such that downstream firms are price takers
in the upstream transport market and to examine the welfare effect of competition in
the transportation industry, we further consider the case in which exporting firms have
monopsony power with respect to the transport service. This extension moderates the
negative effect of an increased number of carriers on the domestic supply. However, since
the domestic supply drops sharply as the number of carriers increases if the spillover
rate is sufficiently high, a higher number of carriers can reduce consumer surplus.
This paper is most closely related to those of Takauchi (2015) and Takauchi and
Mizuno (2019a), who employ a similar market structure. In their setting, exporting
firms must pay a freight charge to ship their products to their rival’s domestic market,
but freely supply to their local market. Takauchi (2015) examines the effect of the cost
efficiency of R&D on exporting firms’ profits. Takauchi and Mizuno (2019a) consider
a hold-up problem resulting from carriers raising prices after observing an exporting
firm’s investment. By contrast, we incorporate price competition among carriers into a
reciprocal market model and examine the effects of the number of carriers on consumer
welfare.
This paper is also related to two strands of literature. One strand focuses on
5Dinda and Mukherjee (2014) show that when the government offers the optimal uniform sub-
sidy/tax, a higher number of inefficient firms harms consumers, though in a different context. Ad-
ditionally, some empirical analyses find that an entry or increased competition can raise prices. See
Grabowski and Vernon (1992) and Thomadsen (2007).
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the nexus of trade barriers and innovation (Ghosh & Lim, 2013; Haaland & Kind,
2008; Hwang et al., 2018; Long et al., 2011; Takauchi & Mizuno, 2019b), and the
other focuses on the explicit treatment of the transport sector in international trade
(Asturias, 2020; Behrens et al., 2009; Behrens & Picard, 2011; Francois & Wooton,
2001; Ishikawa & Tarui, 2018).6 Ghosh and Lim (2013), Haaland and Kind (2008),
and Long et al. (2011) consider the effects of trade liberalization on firms’ process
innovation (i.e., cost-reducing R&D). By contrast, Hwang et al. (2018) and Takauchi
and Mizuno (2019b) consider firms’ product innovation. These studies report different
results on the relationship between trade barriers and innovation incentives, but they
all assume exogenous trade barriers.
Francois and Wooton (2001) focus on an imperfectly competitive transport sec-
tor and examine the effect of tariff reductions in a competitive framework. Asturias
(2020) incorporates carriers who choose their technology into a competitive trade model.
Behrens et al. (2009) and Behrens and Picard (2011) examine the effects of endogenous
freight rates on the firm’s agglomeration. While Behrens et al. (2009) focus on the
carrier’s market power, Behrens and Picard (2011) focus on the logistics problem asso-
ciated with roundtrips. Ishikawa and Tarui (2018) also examine the logistics problem
and consider the role of trade policies in oligopoly markets. While all these studies use
different models to provide useful insights, they assume non-innovative exporting firms
and quantity competition among carriers.
6Moreover, Abe et al. (2014) consider a trade model in which international transportation generates
pollution.
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline model and Section
3 derives the main results. In Section 4, we extend the baseline model to the case in
which exporting firms have monopsony power with respect to the transport service.
Section 5 offers our conclusions. We provide all proofs in the appendix.
2 Model
We consider two regions, the H (Home) and F (Foreign) regions, whose product market
is segmented from each other. Each region has an exporting firm, firm i (i = H,F ),
that engages in cost-reducing R&D activity and supplies its product to the local and
other markets. The inverse demand in region i is pi = a−Qi, where pi is the product
price, Qi = qii+qji is total output, qii is firm i’s domestic supply, qji is firm j’s exports,
i, j = H,F , i ̸= j, and a > 0. The region i’s consumers surplus is CSi = Q2i /2.
As firms have no means of carrying out long haul transportation, they pay a per-
unit transport price, t, and use a transportation service to export their products. The
profit of firm i is
Πi ≡ (pi − ci)qii + (pj − ci − t)qij − x2i for i ̸= j,
where xi is firm i’s investment level and x
2
i is the R&D cost. Firm i’s production cost
after investment is ci ≡ c − xi − δxj ; that is, although firm i invests xi to reduce the
unit cost c, there is a knowledge spillover and the firm i enjoys some part of its rival’s
developed knowledge, δxj , without any payments. δ ∈ [0, 1] is the spillover rate of R&D
and a > c > 0.
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In the transport industry, there are n (≥ 2) identical cargo transporters, which we
refer to as carriers. For simplicity, we assume that carriers exist in regions besides the
Home and Foreign regions. In our model, inter-regional transportation is a homoge-
neous service and carriers compete in a Bertrand fashion. Let the transport price offered
by carrier k (∈ {1, . . . , n}) be tk, carrier k’s individual transport demand be qk, and the
aggregate demand be qHF + qFH . Each firm employs the carriers offering the lowest
price, so the individual transport demand of carrier k is qk = [qHF (t
l) + qFH(t
l)]/m
if the carrier offers the lowest price, tk = t
l. Here, m denotes the number of carriers
offering the lowest price. If carrier k offers a slightly higher price than tl, then qk = 0.
To obtain explicit solutions, we assume that carrier k has a quadratic operation cost,
(λ/2)q2k, where λ > 0 denotes the transport efficiency.
7 The profit of carrier k is
pik ≡ tkqk − λ
2
q2k.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, each firm independently and
simultaneously decides its investment level. In the second stage, the transport price
is determined through price competition among carriers. In the third stage, each firm
independently and simultaneously decides its level of its domestic supply and exports.
The timing structure corresponds to the difficulty of a change in each decision. R&D
generally takes much more time, so its investment decision is in the first stage of the
game. In contrast, since firms can frequently adjust their outputs, the production
7The quadratic cost is popular in this type of price competition. For example, see Dastidar (1995
pp. 27), Dastidar (2001 pp. 85), Delbono and Lambertini (2016a, 2016b), Gori et al. (2014), and
Mizuno and Takauchi (2020).
7
decision occurs in the last stage. Since in the second stage the Nash equilibrium is not
unique, we employ subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) with payoff-dominance
refinement as the equilibrium concept.8 We solve the game using backward induction.
3 Results
In the third stage of the game, the first-order conditions (FOCs) to maximize the profit
of firm i are 0 = a− c− 2qii − qji + xi + δxj and 0 = a− c− qjj − 2qij + xi + δxj − t
(i ̸= j). These FOCs yield the following third-stage outputs of qii(t, x) = 13 [a − c +
t+ (2− δ)xi + (2δ − 1)xj ] and qij(t, x) = 13 [a− c− 2t+ (2− δ)xi + (2δ − 1)xj ], where
i, j = H,F , i ̸= j, and x = (xi, xj).
In the second stage, the transport price t is determined by price competition among
carriers. As Dastidar (1995) demonstrates, if oligopolists with a convex cost engage in
a homogeneous price competition, the Nash equilibrium is not unique. In our model,
the pure strategy Nash equilibria of transport price has a certain range of [ t, t¯ ] derived
from the following two conditions: The first condition is given by
pik(t, x, n) ≡ t
(
qHF (t, x) + qFH(t, x)
n
)
− λ
2
(
qHF (t, x) + qFH(t, x)
n
)2
≥ 0,
which implies that “carriers do not raise their prices.” The second condition is given
by
pik(t, x, n) ≥ pik(t, x, 1) ≡ t
(
qHF (t, x) + qFH(t, x)
)− λ
2
(
qHF (t, x) + qFH(t, x)
)2
,
8For example, Cabon-Dhersin and Drouhin (2014) and Mizuno and Takauchi (2020) employ this
concept.
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which implies that “carriers do not lower their prices.” The first condition yields the
lower bound t, and the second yields the upper bound t¯:
t =
[2(a− c) + (xH + xF )(1 + δ)]λ
2(3n+ 2λ)
; t¯ =
(n+ 1)[2(a− c) + (xH + xF )(1 + δ)]λ
2[(3 + 2λ)n+ 2λ]
.
To narrow the equilibria, we employ the payoff-dominance criterion that maximizes
each carrier’s profit. Since carriers are symmetric, the transport price is
tP = argmax
t
pik(t, x, n) =
[2(a− c) + (xH + xF )(1 + δ)](3n+ 4λ)
8(3n+ 2λ)
.
The prices t, t¯, and tP ,
9 yield Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. (i) tP > t. (ii) tP ≤ t¯ if and only if λ ≥ λ0 ≡ 3n/[2(n− 1)].
To ensure tP < t¯; that is, t = tP ,
10 we require Assumption 1.
Assumption 1. λ > λ0 ≡ 3n/[2(n− 1)].
We next define z to facilitate the analysis.
Definition 1. z ≡ λ/n ∈ [3/2,∞).11
9The price tP is also known as collusive-price because it maximizes joint profit of carriers. To narrow
the set of Nash equilibria, this collusive-price refinement is often employed. For example, see Dastidar
(2001), Gori et al. (2014), and Mizuno and Takauchi (2020). The collusive-price refinement is identical
to the payoff-dominance refinement if the Nash equilibria contain the interior maximizing point of each
carrier’s profit (i.e., the upper bound of the equilibria is strictly larger than the interior maximizer of
each carrier’s profit).
10“t = tP ” is partially consistent with the characteristics of the transport industry. For example, as
indicated by Hummels et al. (2009), ocean shipping is an oligopoly market. Moreover, some studies
report collusion in this industry (e.g., Sjostrom, 2004; Sys, 2009; Sys et al., 2011). Among them, Sys
(2009) empirically demonstrates that the containerized shipping industry is tacitly collusive.
11Although we need z > (3/2)(1/(n− 1)) from Assumption 1 because the maximum of 1/(n− 1) is
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Substituting the outcomes of the third and second stages into the profit of firm i
and solving the FOC, we obtain the following.
x∗i =
(a− c)[48z2 + 144z + 113− (4z + 5)(4z + 11)δ]
E
, (1)
q∗ii =
8(a− c)(2z + 3)(4z + 5)
E
; q∗ij =
16(a− c)(2z + 3)
E
, i ̸= j, (2)
t∗ =
8(a− c)(2z + 3)(4z + 3)
E
, (3)
where
E ≡ (4z + 5)(4z + 11)δ2 − 2(16z2 + 40z + 29)δ + 5(4z + 5)(4z + 7) > 0.
The variable ∗ is the SPNE outcome.
The profits of carrier k and firm i are pi∗k =
(
2z+3
n
)
(q∗ij)
2 and Π∗i = (q
∗
ii)
2 + (q∗ij)
2 −
(x∗i )
2, respectively.
To ensure a positive unit production cost after investment, we require Assumption
2.
Assumption 2. c/(a− c) > (1 + δ)[48z2 + 144z + 113− (4z + 5)(4z + 11)δ]/E.
From (1)–(3), we establish Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. I. If δ > (=, <) δt ≡ 16z2+40z+29(4z+5)(4z+11) , ∂t∗/∂δ, ∂q∗ii/∂δ, and ∂q∗ij/∂δ < (=, >)
0. II. (i) Suppose z < z1 ≃ 5.90928; then, ∂x∗i /∂δ < 0. (ii) Suppose z > z1; then, if
δ < δx, ∂x
∗
i /∂δ > 0. Otherwise, ∂x
∗
i /∂δ ≤ 0. (The threshold δx is defined in Appendix
B.)
Similarly, (1)–(3) yield the following result.
1, λ > λ0 holds for all z ≥ 3/2.
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Proposition 1. (i) Keener competition in the transport industry (i.e., a rise in n) and
higher transport efficiency (i.e., a fall in λ) decreases transport prices and domestic
supply, but these increase exports. (ii) Keener competition in the transport industry and
higher transport efficiency increases the firm’s investment if and only if δ < 5/(8z+7).
We first consider part (i) of Proposition 1. A higher n and a smaller λ (i.e., a
decrease in z) have a similar effect. A higher n lowers transport prices by intensifying
competition among carriers and it therefore increases exports. A smaller λ flattens the
slope of the carriers’ cost curve, which induces a lower transport price, and thereby
promotes exports. Because both a higher n and a lower λ expand imports and makes
competition in the local market tougher, firm i’s domestic supply falls.
Second, we examine the logic behind Lemma 2. A higher δ lowers production costs,
facilitates production activities, and thus increases both domestic supply and exports.
That is, in our model, δ has exactly the same effect on both domestic supply and
exports. Since a higher δ leads to an expansion in transport demand, it encourages
carriers to set higher prices. (A lower δ yields the inverse result.) Hence, if a higher
(lower) δ increases (decreases) transport demand, both outputs and transport prices
increase (decrease) as δ goes up (down) because it also raises (lowers) transport price.
On the one hand, an increase in transport prices raises the trade barrier, which impedes
exports. If δ rises when its level is low enough, because the transport price is low and
the positive effects of a reduction in production costs exceeds the export impeding
effect of rising transport prices, the firm’s exports increase. Conversely, when both δ
and transport prices are high, a rise in δ reduces exports because the export impeding
11
effect becomes large. Transport demand then falls and carriers lower their prices as δ
rises.12
A rise in δ has positive and negative effects on the R&D motive. A higher δ encour-
ages investment because it reduces the unit production cost and facilitates production
(positive effect). If δ increases, because each firm enjoys its rivals developed knowledge
without cost, the R&D motive weakens (negative effect). Investment usually decreases
as δ rises because the negative effect is dominant. This is a well-known result illustrated
by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988).
Different from the standard result, in our model, the positive effect can be dominant.
When λ is large, that is, z is large, transportation is inefficient and its price is high.
A high transport price impedes cross-hauling and strengthens the monopolization of
the local firm in its market. Suppose that the R&D spillover arises, that is, δ slightly
increases from 0 in this case; the unit production cost then falls and outputs increase,
but it also raises transport prices and the domestic supply increases more rapidly than
exports. This strengthens the degree of the local firm’s relative monopoly in its market.
Because such enlargement in the domestic supply promotes investment and the positive
effect becomes dominant, R&D investment increases as δ rises. However, if δ goes
above a certain level, the negative effect is dominant since an inflow of the rival firm’s
developed knowledge becomes large.
12Additionally, ∂x∗i /∂δ can explain why the transport prices and the firm’s outputs have the same
change for δ. From the third-stage outputs and t = tP , noting that xi = xj in equilibrium, the total
differentiation of qii = qii(x, t, δ), qij = qij(x, t, δ), and t = t(x, δ) yields dt/dδ =
3n+4λ
4(3n+2λ)
[
xi + (1 +
δ) dxi
dδ
]
, dqii/dδ =
5n+4λ
4(3n+2λ)
[
xi + (1 + δ)
dxi
dδ
]
, and dqij/dδ =
n
2(3n+2λ)
[
xi + (1 + δ)
dxi
dδ
]
.
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We next consider part (ii) of Proposition 1, which indicates that to raise investment
by lowering transport prices, δ should be sufficiently small. The intuition is as follows.
As we show in Lemma 2, when δ is sufficiently small, the transport price is also low
and the degree of export restriction is weak. Although a higher n and a smaller λ
commonly reduce transport prices and increase exports, they decrease the domestic
supply. If δ is sufficiently small, because the transport price reduction leads to an
increase in exports in excess of the decrease in the domestic supply, a higher n and a
smaller λ can encourage investment. In contrast, if δ is large, a higher n and a smaller λ
can never encourage investment because the degree of the reduction in domestic supply
becomes larger.
Does an increase in the number of carriers and improved transport efficiency make
consumers better off? We next focus on the effects of z on consumer surplus. To
examine this, we use (2) and obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Keener competition in the transport industry and higher transport
efficiency reduces consumer surplus if and only if the R&D spillover rate is sufficiently
high; that is, ∂Q∗i /∂z > 0 if and only if δ > δcs. (The threshold δcs is defined in
Appendix B.)
[Fig. 1 around here]
Panel (a) of Fig. 1 depicts Proposition 2. As long as the R&D spillover is not too
high, the trade promotion due to the transport price reduction increases total output,
Qi = qii + qji, and lowers the product price and consumer surplus therefore increases.
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However, Proposition 2 indicates that this promotion of inter-regional trade is not
always desirable for consumers. A key to this result is the role of ∂t∗/∂z.
A higher δ lowers the production costs of firms and increases aggregate transport
demand. When the aggregate transport demand is high, each carrier’s individual de-
mand is also high because carriers are symmetric. Then, suppose that the number of
carriers n increases; that is, z (≡ λ/n) decreases. Tougher competition among them re-
duces each carrier’s demand, and the size of the demand that the carrier loses increases
as the aggregate transport demand increases. Although each carrier lowers its price if
there is a reduction in its demand, carriers sharply lower their prices compared to the
case of low aggregate transport demand because the size of the lost demand increases
as the aggregate transport demand increases. Hence, a higher δ strengthens ∂t∗/∂z.13
Although a higher δ facilitates production, it can raise transport prices (Lemma 2).
A higher δ has both export promotion and restriction effects and a higher δ therefore
strengthens ∂q∗ji/∂z in some cases, but it weakens ∂q
∗
ji/∂z in the other cases. On the
one hand, as we show in Proposition 1, a higher n (or lower z) reduces domestic supply
because transport prices (i.e., the rival firm’s trade barrier) fall. If δ is high, the degree
of reduction in domestic supply for an increase in n is also large because the degree of
the reduction in transport prices for an increase in n is large. That is, when δ rises,
the “∂t∗/∂z” effect becomes stronger, which strengthens the “∂q∗ii/∂z” effect.
We illustrate ∂q∗ii/∂z and −(∂q∗ji/∂z) as functions of δ in Panel (b) of Fig. 1. (Since
∂q∗ji/∂z has a negative value, we multiply it by −1.) As δ increases above a certain
13
∀z ≥ 3/2, (∂/∂δ)(∂t∗/∂z) > 0 holds.
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level, ∂q∗ii/∂z (the increasing curve) exceeds −(∂q∗ji/∂z) (the inverted U-shaped curve).
Hence, if δ is sufficiently high, ∂Q∗i /∂z has a positive value. When δ is high, a higher
n (lower z) reduces total output.
4 An Extension
Duopsony in the transport market
In Section 3, we assumed that firms are price takers in relation to the transport service,
that is, firms have monopoly power in the downstream product market, whereas they
do not have monopsony power in the upstream transport market. Although this as-
sumption is frequently employed in the study of vertically related markets, there is also
a criticism that “while downstream firms recognize their monopoly power and strate-
gically behave as sellers in the downstream market, they do not strategically behave
as buyers and are price takers in the upstream market.”14 To avoid such criticism, we
further examine the situation in which firms have monopsony power in the transport
service market.
To examine the situation in which the export decision of each firm directly affects
to the transport supply, we consider the following timing of the game.
• First stage: The firm i (i = H,F ) chooses its investment level, xi.
• Second stage: Given the transport price t, each carrier k (k = 1, ..., n) chooses
its freight traffic, qk. Then, the shape of the inverse transport supply function,
14For this criticism see, for example, Ishikawa and Spencer (1999). They offer some arguments to
justify the assumption such that downstream firms are price takers in the upstream market.
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t = T (qHF + qFH), is fixed.
• Third stage: Given the inverse transport supply function, firm i decides its ex-
ports, qij , and domestic supply qii (i, j = H,F and i ̸= j).
• Fourth stage: The transport market is cleared by the equilibrium price, t.
The game is solved using backward induction. In Appendix A, we report the detailed
procedure used to obtain the SPNE of this game and the necessary equilibrium out-
comes.
When firms have monopsony power regarding the transport service, they can lower
the transport price by decreasing their export volume because their exports (i.e., volume
of traffic) influences to the inverse transport supply. Hence, in the duopsony case, the
equilibrium transport price, td∗, is lower compared to the case in which they are price
takers, that is, t∗ > td∗.15
The following proposition addresses the impact of z on the outputs, the transport
price, and the investment, which are derived from (A1) and (A2) in Appendix A.
Proposition 3. Suppose that exporting firms have monpsony power in the transporta-
tion market. Then, (i) keener competition in the transport industry and higher trans-
port efficiency decrease transport prices, but these factors increase exports. If δ > δdds,
then keener competition in the transport industry and higher transport efficiency de-
crease domestic supply. Otherwise, these factors increase domestic supply. (We de-
fine the threshold δdds in Appendix B.) (ii) Keener competition in the transport in-
15We summarize this result as “Lemma S1” in Supplementary Material.
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dustry and higher transport efficiency increases the firms’ investment if and only if
δ < 2(38z
3+55z2+30z+9)
92z3+154z2+84z+9
∈ (0, 1).
Part (i) of Proposition 3 has partially different results from part (i) of Proposition 1.
In the price-taker case, since carriers decide their prices, if they raise their prices, then
they inhibit the foreign firm’s exports because this increases the trade barrier. Hence,
competition in the domestic market softens. Then, the local firm always increases its
domestic supply. By contrast, in the duopsony case, because carriers do not directly
decide their prices, the change in both exports and domestic supply as z changes can
be the same. However, when δ becomes large, because the transport demand increases
due to the expanding outputs through a reduction in production costs, the transport
price increases, as with the price-taker case. If the transport price is at a high level,
then the effect of its change is also strong.16 Then, the foreign rival’s exports increase
sharply due to a fall in z, so the domestic supply decreases.
The logic behind part (ii) of Proposition 3 is same as for part (ii) of Proposition 1.
When δ is large enough, the degree of the decrease in the transport price as z decreases
is large. Because this strengthens the effect of the domestic supply reduction due to a
rise in the rival’s exports, a fall in z weakens the motive for R&D investment.
From (A3) in Appendix A, we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose that exporting firms have monpsony power in the transporta-
tion market. (i) If z < z2 ≃ 2.58114 or [δ < δdcs and z > z2], then keener competition
in the transport industry and higher transport efficiency increase consumer surplus.
16
∀z ≥ 3/2, (∂/∂δ)(∂td∗/∂z) > 0.
17
(ii) If δ > δdcs and z > z2, then keener competition in the transport industry and higher
transport efficiency reduce consumer surplus. (We define the threshold δdcs > 0 in Ap-
pendix B.)
[Fig. 2 around here]
A rise in the spillover rate, δ, strengthens the degree of a change in the transport
price due to a change in z (i.e., the “∂t/∂z” effect), and also strengthens the degree of
change in the domestic supply due to a change in z (i.e., the “∂qii/∂z” effect). Hence,
when δ is sufficiently high, the “∂qii/∂z” effect is dominant, and thus, the area such
that ∂Q/∂z > 0 appears (see Fig. 1). On the one hand, in the duopsony case, the
equilibrium transport price is lower than that in the price-taker case (i.e., t∗ > td∗).
Because the decline in the transport price makes the “∂t/∂z” effect weaker, the “∂t/∂z”
effect in the duopsony case becomes weaker than that in the price-taker case.17 As
shown in the logic behind Proposition 2, if the “∂t/∂z” effect becomes weaker, the
“∂qii/∂z” effect also becomes weaker. Hence, in the duopsony case, the “∂qii/∂z”
effect is weaker than that in the price-taker case. Therefore, in the duopsony, the value
of the spillover rate that makes the “∂qii/∂z” effect dominant (i.e., the threshold δ
d
cs)
is higher than that in the price-taker case. Panels (a) and (b) in Fig. 2 illustrate this
relationship.
17Using Mathematica plotting, we find that ∂t∗/∂z > ∂td∗/∂z > 0.
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5 Conclusion
This paper considers the effects of an increase in the number of carriers on a firm’s
R&D investment and consumer surplus. In a simple two-region (or country) R&D
rivalry model with a transport sector, we show that R&D investment rises as the
number of carriers increases if the R&D spillover is small, and decreases as the number
of carriers increases if the spillover is large enough. We also show that although a
higher number of carriers lowers the transport price, it can reduce consumer surplus in
each region. We further extend the case in which firms have no market power (i.e., are
price-takers) to the case in which firms have monopsony power over the transportation
service. However, firms can lower the transport price by reducing their export volumes,
and hence the equilibrium transport price in the duopsony case is lower than that in
the price-taker case, a higher number of carriers also reduces consumer surplus if the
R&D spillover is sufficiently large. Hence, competition in the transport sector can
harm consumers. Our model highlights the results of competition promotion, and we
therefore believe that our analysis provides a new insight into studies of competition
and welfare.
In this paper, we do not consider the possibility of improved production efficiency
due to foreign direct investment (FDI). While the level of transport costs possibly
affects a firm’s FDI decision, this aspect is beyond the scope of our analysis. In the
case of international trade with transportation services, it may be fruitful for future
research to examine exporting firms’ FDI strategies.
19
Appendix
A. The SPNE outcomes in a duopsony of exporting firms
We present the calculation to derive the equilibrium outcomes in the game in which
firms have monopsony power in the transport market.
In the fourth stage of the game, the equilibrium transport price is decided so as
to equalize transport supply with its demand. However, the transport demand, total
exports of two firms, is chosen in the third stage. Thus, to solve the game correctly,
we assume an inverse transport-supply function, t = T (qHF + qFH), and consider this
in the third stage.
• The third stage. From the profit of firm i and t = T (qHF + qFH), the FOCs for
profit maximization of firms are ∂Πi/∂qii = 0 ⇔ a− c− 2qii − qji + xi + δxj = 0 and
∂Πi/∂qij = 0 ⇔ a− c− 2qij − qjj + xi + δxj − t− T ′(qHF + qFH)qij = 0 (i ̸= j). Let
“′” be the first derivative and T ′ = T ′( · ). The FOCs yield the third-stage outputs:
qii(t, x;T
′) = [a − c + (2 − δ)xi + (2δ − 1)xj + t + (a − c + xi + δxj)T ′]/(3 + 2T ′) and
qij(t, x;T
′) = [a− c+ (2− δ)xi + (2δ − 1)xj − 2t]/(3 + 2T ′).
• The second stage. The carrier k’s maximization problem, maxqk pik, yields qk =
t/λ. Because the transport demand is qHF + qFH , the market clearing condition is
qHF +qFH =
∑n
k=1 qk = nt/λ. From this, the inverse transport supply in this subgame
is t = T (qHF + qFH) = (qHF + qFH)λ/n, and hence, T
′ = λ/n holds. Plugging
t = (qHF + qFH)λ/n and T
′ = λ/n into the third-stage outputs and solving these for
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outputs again, we obtain the second-stage outputs:
qii(x) =
(a− c)(3n+ 2λ)(n+ 3λ) + uixi + ujxj
3(n+ 2λ)(3n+ 2λ)
,
qij(x) =
n[(a− c)(3n+ 2λ) + vixi + vjxj ]
3(n+ 2λ)(3n+ 2λ)
,
where ui ≡ 2(3n2 + 8nλ+ 3λ2)− n(3n+ 5λ)δ, uj ≡ 2(3n2 + 8nλ+ 3λ2)δ− n(3n+ 5λ),
vi ≡ 2(3n+ 5λ)− (3n+ 8λ)δ, and vj ≡ 2(3n+ 5λ)δ − (3n+ 8λ).
The above qij(x) yields the second-stage transport price: t(x) =
(2(a−c)+(1+δ)(xH+xF ))λ
3(n+2λ) .
• The first stage. In this stage, each firm decides its investment level, xi. The
objective function of firm i, Πi(x), is derived from qii(x), qij(x), and t(x) . Solving the
FOCs, ∂Πi(x)/∂xi = 0 (i = H,F ), with respect to xi, we obtain the following SPNE
investment level:
xd∗i =
(a− c)[2(9z3+32z2+25z+6)−(23z2+25z+6)δ]
K
, (A1)
where
K ≡ 54z3+116z2+76z+15− (2z+3)(9z2+7z+2)δ + (23z2+25z+6)δ2 > 0.
We need the following assumption to ensure a positive (unit) production cost.
Assumption 3. c/(a− c) > (1 + δ)[2(9z3+32z2+25z+6)−(23z2+25z+6)δ]/K.
The SNPE outputs and transport price are
qd∗ii =
3(a−c)(2z+1)(2z+3)(3z+1)
K
; qd∗ij =
3(a−c)(2z+1)(2z+3)
K
,
td∗ =
6(a− c)z(2z + 1)(2z + 3)
K
.

 (A2)
The profit of carrier k and firm i are pid∗k =
1
n t
d∗qd∗ij and Π
d∗
i = (q
d∗
ii )
2+(qd∗ij )
2−(xd∗i )2.
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The equilibrium outputs yield the total output in region i:
Qd∗i = q
d∗
ii + q
d∗
ji =
3(a− c)(2z + 1)(2z + 3)(3z + 2)
K
, j ̸= i. (A3)
B. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) A simple algebra yields tP − t = 3n[2(a−c)+(xH+xF )(1+δ)]8(3n+2λ) > 0.
(ii) Since t¯− tP = 3n[2(a−c)+(xH+xF )(1+δ)][2λ(n−1)−3n]8(3n+2λ)[(3+2λ)n+2λ] , tP ≤ t¯ iff λ ≥ 3n2(n−1) . Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. I. Differentiating (2) and (3) with respect to δ yields ∂t∗/∂δ =
16(a−c)(2z+3)(4z+3)
E2
L1, ∂q
∗
ii/∂δ =
16(a−c)(2z+3)(4z+5)
E2
L1, and ∂q
∗
ij/∂δ =
32(a−c)(2z+3)
E2
L1,
where L1 ≡ 16z2 + 40z + 29− (4z + 5)(4z + 11)δ. These yield part I.
II. Differentiating (1) with respect to δ yields ∂x∗i /∂δ =
(a−c)
E2
L2, where L2 ≡ 256z4 −
512z3−4640z2−7008z−3071−2δ(4z+5)(4z+11)(48z2+144z+113)+δ2(4z+5)2(4z+
11)2. Solving L2 ≥ 0 for δ, we obtain δ ≤ δx ≡ 48z
2+144z+113−4
√
2
√
(2z+3)2(4z+5)(4z+11)
(4z+5)(4z+11) ;
δx is increasing for z, limz→∞ δx = (3 − 2
√
2) ≃ 0.171573, and δx = 0 for z = z1 ≃
5.90928. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Differentiating (2) and (3) with respect to z yields
∂t∗
∂z
= 16(a−c)[9(23δ
2−18δ+55)+16(7δ2−2δ+15)z2+8(37δ2−22δ+85)z]
E2
> 0,
∂q∗ii
∂z
= 16(a−c)[125δ
2−38δ+125+16(5δ2+2δ+5)z2+8(25δ2+2δ+25)z]
E2
> 0,
∂q∗ij
∂z
= −32(a−c)[41δ2−62δ+185+16(δ2−2δ+5)z(3+z)]
E2
< 0.
(ii) Differentiating (1) with respect to z yields ∂x∗i /∂z =
128(a−c)(2z+3)
E2
[δ(8z + 7) − 5],
which implies (ii). Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 2. Since CS∗i = (Q
∗
i )
2/2, sign{∂CS∗i /∂z} = sign{∂Q∗i /∂z}. The
differentiation of total output yields ∂Q∗i /∂z =
16(a−c)
E2
[(48z2 + 104z + 43)(δ2 + 2δ) −
5(4z + 7)2]. Thus, ∂Q∗i /∂z ≥ 0 for δ ≥ δcs ≡ −1 +
4
√
2
√
(2z+3)2(48z2+104z+43)
48z2+104z+43
(> 0); δcs
is decreasing for z and δcs = 1 for z = (
√
30 − 1)/4 ≃ 1.11931. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Differentiating (A2) with respect to z, we have
∂td∗
∂z
=
6(a− c)
K2
[
4(23δ2 − 5δ + 8)z4 + 4(50δ2 − 23δ + 71)z3
+(203δ2 − 149δ + 440)z2 + 3(2δ2 − 2δ + 5)(16z + 3)
]
> 0,
∂qd∗ij
∂z
= −9(a− c)
K2
[
9(δ2 − δ + 4) + 24(3− δ)(z + 4)z3
+2(14δ2 − 65δ + 185)z2 + 6(5δ2 − 11δ + 32)z
]
< 0,
∂qd∗ii
∂z
=
9(a− c)
K2
[
9 + 48z + 70z2 − 4z3 − 40z4 + δ(2z + 3)2(z2 − 2z − 1)
+ δ2(92z4 + 200z3 + 175z2 + 66z + 9)
]
.
From the above equations, we have ∂qd∗ii /∂z ≤ (>) 0 if δ ≤ (>) δdds, where δdds ≡
√
3
√
(2z+1)2L3−(2z+3)2(z2−2z−1)
184z4+400z3+350z2+132z+18
and L3 ≡ 1228z6+1564z5−1429z4−4020z3−2970z2−
864z − 81. Since L3 > 0 for z > 1.56433, in this range, we find that
(√
3
√
(2z + 1)2L3
)2
− [(2z + 3)2(z2 − 2z − 1)]2
= 4(3680z8+8368z7+1360z6−15076z5−22054z4−14784z3−5373z2−1026z−81)
≥ 0 for z ≥ z2 ≃ 1.56576.
Furthermore, δdds < 1, and δ
d
ds →
√
921−1
46 ≃ 0.638 as z →∞. Hence, part (i) holds.
(ii) Differentiating (A1) with respect to z yields ∂xd∗i /∂z =
9(a−c)(2z+1)
K2
[δ(92z3+154z2+
84z + 9)− 76z3 − 110z2 − 60z − 18], which implies part (ii). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. Differentiating (A3) with respect to z yields
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∂Qd∗i
∂z
=
9(a−c)
K2
[
z(92z3+200z2+147z+36)δ2+z(7z+4)(2z+3)2δ
−(4z + 3)(28z3 + 52z2 + 36z + 9)
]
.
Thus, ∂Qd∗i /∂z ≥ 0 if δ ≥ δdcs, where δdcs ≡
√
3
√
z(2z+1)2M1 −z(7z+4)(2z+3)2
2z(92z3+200z2+147z+36)
and M1 ≡
3500z5 + 13388z4 + 21243z3 + 17496z2 + 7452z + 1296. From the equation of δdcs,
(√
3
√
z(2z + 1)2M1
)2
− [z(2z + 3)2(7z + 4)]2
= 4z(4z + 3)(28z3 + 52z2 + 36z + 9)(92z3 + 200z2 + 147z + 36) > 0,
so δdcs > 0. We find that δ
d
cs → 5
√
105 −7
46 ≃ 0.961625 as z → ∞, and δdcs − 1 ≤ 0 for
z ≥ z2 ≃ 2.58114. Q.E.D.
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Figure 1: Illustration of Proposition 2.
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Supplementary Material (Not for Publication)
In this supplement, we first provide the two additional results in Section 4 of the
paper, and provide the welfare analysis.
1. Two additional results in Section 4.
Lemma S1. t∗ > td∗ ∀z ≡ λ/n ≥ 3/2.
Proof. The difference between t∗ and td∗ is
t∗ − td∗ = 2(a− c)(2z + 3)
EK
[ϕ(δ)] ,
where ϕ(δ) ≡ 180 + 627z + 838z2 + 824z3 + 384z4 − 2(36 + 111z + 152z2 + 148z3 +
48z4)δ + (72 + 231z + 154z2 − 64z3 − 96z4)δ2. Note that
E ≡ (4z + 5)(4z + 11)δ2 − 2(16z2 + 40z + 29)δ + 5(4z + 5)(4z + 7) > 0 and
K ≡ 54z3 + 116z2 + 76z + 15− (2z + 3)(9z2 + 7z + 2)δ + (23z2 + 25z + 6)δ2 > 0.
Thus, sign{t∗ − td∗} = sign{ϕ(δ)}.
Let A ≡ 72+231z+154z2−64z3−96z4 in ϕ(δ). Then, from numerical calculation,
A > (=, <) 0 for z < (=, >) zA ≃ 1.55637. To show that ϕ(δ) > 0 ∀z ≥ 3/2, we need
to consider the sign of ϕ(δ) in the following three cases: (i) A = 0, (ii) A > 0, and (iii)
A < 0.
Case (i) A = 0. When z = zA, ϕ(δ)|z=zA is monotonically decreasing with respect
to δ. Since ϕ(δ = 1)|z=zA = 5712.19 > 0, t∗ > td∗.
Case (ii) A > 0. In this case, ϕ(δ) is downward convex. Solving ϕ(δ) = 0 for δ,
we obtain
δ+, δ− =
(36 + 111z + 152z2 + 148z3 + 48z4)± 2√3√(2z + 1)Γ
72 + 231z + 154z2 − 64z3 − 96z4
i
and Γ ≡ 1632z7 + 4096z6 + 2558z5 − 3201z4 − 7992z3 − 8235z2 − 4617z − 972. From
numerical calculation, Γ ≤ 0 for z ≤ zˇ ≃ 1.37274, so Γ > 0 for all z ≥ 3/2.
δ+ and δ− yield
δ+ − 1 = 2
{
(72z4 + 106z3 − z2 − 60z − 18) +√3√(2z + 1)Γ}
A
,
δ− − 1 = 2
{
(72z4 + 106z3 − z2 − 60z − 18)−√3√(2z + 1)Γ}
A
.
72z4 + 106z3 − z2 − 60z − 18 > 0 for all z ≥ 3/2, so δ+ − 1 > 0. Further,
(
72z4 + 106z3 − z2 − 60z − 18)2 − (√3√(2z + 1)Γ)2
=
(
45 + 159z + 172z2 + 116z3 + 48z4
)
A > 0. (S1)
Thus, (S1) yields δ− − 1 > 0, which implies that t∗ > td∗ for all 3/2 ≤ z < zA.
Case (iii) A < 0. Since its numerator is positive, δ+ < 0. By contrast, from the
numerator of δ−, we obtain
(
48z4 + 148z3 + 152z2 + 111z + 36
)2 − (√3√(2z + 1)Γ)2
=
(
384z4 + 824z3 + 838z2 + 627z + 180
)
A < 0.
Hence, δ− > 0. On the one hand, from (S1), the numerator of δ− − 1 is negative, and
its denominator, A, is also negative; thus, δ−−1 > 0. Therefore, t∗ > td∗ for all z > zA.
Q.E.D.
Lemma S2. ∂Πd∗i /∂z > 0 ∀z ≡ λ/n ≥ 3/2.
Proof. Differentiating Πd∗i with respect to z, we obtain
∂Πd∗i
∂z
=
27(a− c)2(2z + 1)2
K3
[ξ(δ)] ,
where ξ(δ) ≡ 144z5 + 1216z4 + 2138z3 + 1440z2 + 378z + 27 − 3(2z + 1)(3z2 + 13z +
6)(28z2+30z+9)δ+(552z5+2672z4+4222z3+2961z2+837z+54)δ2. ξ(δ) is downward
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convex. The discriminant of “ξ(δ) = 0” is (2z+3)2(−15984z8−258096z7−785156z6−
990908z5 − 561419z4 − 82110z3 + 50841z2 + 21600z + 2268) and has a negative value
for any z > 0.332382, so ξ(δ) = 0 does not have real roots and ξ(δ) > 0 ∀z ≥ 3/2. This
implies ∂Πd∗i /∂z > 0. Q.E.D.
2. Welfare analysis
• Price-taker case
z and δ have the following effects on the profits of the firms and carriers.
Lemma S3. I. ∂Π∗i /∂z > 0 and ∂Π
∗
i /∂δ > 0. II. (i) ∂pi
∗
k/∂n < 0, ∂pi
∗
k/∂λ < 0, and
∂
(∑n
k=1 pi
∗
k
)
/∂z < 0. (ii) If δ > (=, <) δt ≡ 16λ2+40λn+29n2(4λ+5n)(4λ+11n) , then ∂pi∗k/∂δ < (=, >) 0.
Proof. I. From Π∗i , we obtain ∂Π
∗
i /∂z = [512(a− c)2(2z+3)2/E3][3(47δ2−56δ+25)+
16(7δ2 − 4δ + 5)z2 + 16(17δ2 − 13δ + 10)z] > 0 and
∂Π∗i
∂δ
=
2(a− c)2(4z + 5)
E3
×


29696z5+221952z4+678272z3+1054112z2+829172z+263171
+ δ3(4z+5)2(4z+11)3−3δ2(4z+5)(4z+11)2(48z2+144z+113)
− δ(4z + 7)(4z + 11)(832z3 + 3024z2 + 3756z + 1563)

 > 0.
II. (i) From pi∗k and
∑n
k=1 pi
∗
k = npi
∗
k, we obtain
∂pi∗k
∂n
= −256(a−c)2(2z+3)2[3(55δ2−58δ+175)+16(7δ2−2δ+15)z2+8(31δ2−28δ+85)z]
n2E3
< 0,
∂pi∗k
∂λ
= −512(a−c)2(2z+3)2[3(9δ2−22δ+65)+16(δ2−2δ+5)z2+16(2δ2−7δ+15)z]
n2E3
< 0.
∂ (
∑n
k=1 pi
∗
k)
∂z
= n2
(
∂pi∗k
∂λ
)
< 0.
(ii) From pi∗k, ∂pi
∗
k/∂δ =
1024(a−c)2(2z+3)3
nE3
[16z2 + 40z + 29 − (4z + 5)(4z + 11)δ], which
implies part (ii). Q.E.D.
This result is intuitive. Since a larger n and a smaller λ promote less efficient
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supply activity, that is, exports, they reduce the firm’s profit. In contrast, a higher
δ decreases production costs, and thus increases the firm’s profit. The carrier’s profit
depends on the transport price, so ∂pi∗k/∂n and ∂pi
∗
k/∂δ correspond to the changes in
the transport price. A smaller λ implies an efficiency improvement in transportation,
and it thus increases the carrier’s profit. A larger n; that is, a fall in z, toughens the
competition among carriers and reduces each existing carrier’s profit. However, the
aggregate number of carriers increases and the total amount of their profits increases.
Subsequently, we examine the effects of a change in the number of carriers on each
region’s social surplus and that of the entire world. The social surplus in region i
(i = H,F ) is the sum of consumer surplus and the profit of firm i, which is given by
SW ∗i =
(a−c)2
E2
[
3840z4 + 22016z3 + 48160z2 + 47712z + 18047
+2(4z+5)(4z+11)(48z2+144z+113)δ − (4z+5)2(4z+11)2δ2
]
.
(S2)
World welfare, WW , consists of the two countries’ social surplus and the total
profits of all carriers, that is, WW ∗ ≡∑i=H,F SW ∗i +∑nk=1 pi∗k. pi∗k and (S2) yield
WW ∗ =
2(a−c)2
E2
[
3840z4 + 23040z3 + 52768z2 + 54624z + 21503
+ (4z+5)(4z+11)(48z2+144z+113)δ − (16z2+64z+55)2δ2
]
.
(S3)
From (S2) and (S3), we establish the following proposition.
Proposition S1. Suppose that all carriers belong to all regions except the two regions,
H and F . Then, keener competition in the transport industry and higher transport
efficiency (i) always reduce each region’s social surplus (i.e., ∂SW ∗i /∂z > 0); (ii)
reduce the world’s welfare if and only if the R&D spillover rate is sufficiently high; that
is, ∂WW ∗/∂z > 0 if and only if δ > δww.
Proof. (i) Differentiating (S2) with respect to z yields ∂SW ∗i /∂z =
128(a−c)2(2z+3)
E3
N ,
where N ≡ (1088z3+4272z2+5292z+1993)δ2−2(4z+7)(16z2+88z+101)δ+5(64z3+
112z2 − 84z − 163). N > 0 if z > 1.37301; Therefore, ∂SW ∗i /∂z > 0 ∀z ≥ 3/2.
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(ii) Differentiating (S3) with respect to z yields
∂WW ∗
∂z
=
256(a−c)2(2z+3)
E3
[
(1024z3+4048z2+4992z+1831)δ2
−2(144z2+552z+509)δ − 5(176z2+528z+397)
]
.
Thus, ∂WW ∗/∂z ≥ 0 if and only if
δ ≥ δww ≡ 509+552z+144z
2+4
√
(3+2z)2(27039+70232z+55984z2+14080z3)
1831+4992z+4048z2+1024z3
. Since δww is mono-
tonically decreasing for z, limz→∞ δww = 0, and δww
∣∣
z=3/2
= 1661+24
√
305871
21883 ≃ 0.682463,
δww ∈
(
0, 1661+24
√
305871
21883
]
∀z ≥ 3/2. Q.E.D.
We first consider part (i). From the definition of social surplus, the symmetric
outcomes (xi = xj , qii = qjj , qij = qji, and pi = pj), and p
′
i = −1, we can decompose
the effects of a change in z (e.g., a change in n or λ) on welfare as follows:
∂SWi
∂z
= [pi − (c− (1 + δ)xi)] ∂qii
∂z︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i) Domestic supply effect (+)
+ [(1 + δ)Qi − 2xi] ∂xi
∂z︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii) Investment effect (+)/(−)
+ [pj − (c− (1 + δ)xi)− t] ∂qij
∂z︸ ︷︷ ︸
(iii) Export effect (−)
+
(
−qij ∂t
∂z
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(iv) Transport price effect (−)
.
(S4)
There are four effects (terms (i)–(iv)) in (S4) (for more detail, see “The four effects
in (S4)”). The domestic supply effect, term (i), is positive because a decrease in z (i.e.,
an increase in n and a decrease in λ) raises the rival firm’s exports and strengthens the
competition in the domestic market. The investment effect, term (ii), depends on the
change in investment ∂x∗i /∂z and the effect can therefore be positive when the R&D
spillover is low; otherwise, it is negative. Both the export and transport price effects,
which correspond to terms (iii) and (iv), respectively, are negative. Since a decrease in
z promotes exports, the export effect is negative. A fall in transport prices curtails the
inefficiency of cross-hauling; this effect is therefore also negative.
In our model, the domestic supply effect (term (i)) dominates any other effects
because the domestic supply production is more efficient than that for export activities.
The difference in supply efficiencies makes the domestic supply larger than that of
v
exports, and the domestic supply therefore sharply decreases when the competition in
the local market increases due to the promotion of the rival firm’s exports. A fall in z;
that is, a rise in n, reduces welfare.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
2 2.5 3 z
-0.010
-0.005
0.005
0.010
0.015
Figure 3: Graph of “(each term)/(a− c)2.” (δ = 1/4)
We illustrate this result in Fig. 3. If the spillover rate of R&D is low, then the
investment effect can be negative. Thus, all terms can be negative except for (i) if the
spillover rate is low. Fig. 3 depicts each term when δ = 1/4. Even in this case, we can
immediately see that (i) (the curve (i) in Fig. 3) is extremely large compared to the
other terms.
In contrast, world welfare includes the transport sector’s profit, which may therefore
improve due to competition among carriers. As Lemma S3 shows, the transport sector’s
profit,
∑n
k=1 pi
∗
k, increases as z decreases. To understand part (ii), it is enough to
incorporate this negative effect into the argument of part (i). As we illustrated in the
logic behind Proposition 2, a higher (lower) spillover rate strengthens (weakens) the
effect of a change in the domestic supply due to a change in z (i.e., ∂q∗ii/∂z). Hence,
when the spillover rate is small, the effect of term (i) in (S4) is not sufficiently strong.
Then, because the effect of “∂(
∑n
k=1 pi
∗
k)/∂z” and other negative effects (terms (iii) and
(iv) in (S4)) can be dominant, a fall in z improves the world welfare.
• Duopsony case
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The social surplus in region i, SW d∗i =
1
2(Q
d∗
i )
2 +Πd∗i , is
SW d∗i =
(a−c)2
2K2
[
3240z6+14688z5+25720z4+23200z3+11683z2+3162z+360
+8(23z2+25z+6)(9z3+32z2+25z+6)δ − 2(23z2+25z+6)2δ2
]
.
(S5)
From (S5), we establish the following proposition.
Proposition S2. Suppose that all carriers belong to regions other the two regions
H and F . Then, keener competition in the transport industry and higher transport
efficiency reduce each region’s social surplus if and only if the R&D spillover rate is
sufficiently high. That is, ∂SW d∗i /∂z > 0 if and only if δ > δ
d
sw.
Proof. Differentiating SW d∗i with respect to z yields
∂SW d∗i
∂z
=
27(a− c)2(2z + 1)
K3
×


(
1656z6+8292z5+15150z4+13471z3+5985z2+1161z+54
)
δ2
− (840z6+5492z5+10586z4+9687z3+4833z2+1323z+162) δ
−384z6−632z5−776z4−1498z3−1638z2−783z−135

 .
Solving ∂SW d∗i /∂z ≥ 0 for δ, we obtain δ ≥ δdsw, where
δdsw ≡
M2 + (2z + 1)(2z + 3)
√
M3
2(1656z6+8292z5+15150z4+13471z3+5985z2+1161z+54)
,
M2 ≡ 840z6+5492z5+10586z4+9687z3+4833z2+1323z+162, and M3 ≡ 203076z8+
822036z7+1677397z6+2360146z5+2340511z4+1501530z3+560061z2+103248z+6156.
We find that δdsw → 35+
√
5641
138 ≃ 0.797874 as z →∞, and δdsw− 1 ≤ 0 for z ≥ zˆ ≃ 0.569.
Hence, δdsw ∈ (0, 1) ∀z ≥ 3/2. Q.E.D.
The logic behind Proposition S2 is intuitive. A fall in z reduces the transport price
and promotes less efficient supply activity (i.e., exports), and it therefore decreases the
firms’ profits, as is the case for price takers. However, as Proposition 4 shows, the area
in which the total output (or consumers surplus) rises due to a decline in z expands,
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and we can thus find an area in which the social surplus increases due to a decline in
z. Different from the price-taker case, in a duopsony, even if the region contains no
carrier, an increase in the number of carriers can enhance the social surplus of that
region.
• The four effects in (S4)
(i) Domestic supply effect (term (i)) is
[pi−(c−(1+δ)xi)]∂qii
∂z
= 128(a−c)
2(2z+3)(4z+5)
E3
[
125δ2−38δ+125+16(5δ2+2δ+5)z2
+8(25δ2+2δ+25)z
]
> 0.
(ii) Investment effect (term (ii)) is
[(1+δ)Qi−2xi]∂xi
∂z
= 256(a−c)
2(2z+3)[δ(8z+7)−5]
E3
[139δ−29+16(3δ−1)z2+8(21δ−5)z] ⋛ 0.
(iii) Export effect (term (iii)) is
[pj−(c−(1+δ)xi)−t] ∂qij
∂z
= −512(a−c)2(2z+3)
E3
[
41δ2−62δ+185 + 16(δ2−2δ+5)z2
+48(δ2 − 2δ + 5)z
]
< 0.
(iv) Transport price effect (term (iv)) is
−qij ∂t
∂z
= −256(a−c)2(2z+3)
E3
[
9(23δ2 − 18δ + 55) + 16(7δ2 − 2δ + 15)z2
+8(37δ2 − 22δ + 85)z
]
< 0.
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